4RECENT CASES.*
BANKS AND BANIx,-PowER OF NATIONAL BANKS To Ab' AS FziucIARI.-After the Rittenhouse Trust Company had been appointed as guardian of the Turner children, but before receiving its wards' property, it was
transformed into a national bank. Its petition to the court to be reappointed as guardian was refused upon the ground that the Federal legislation permitting national banks to act as fiduciaries was in contravention of
the law of Pennsylvania in that the Federal act required administrative
methods different from those specified by the state. The National Bank appealed. Held: Appeal allowed. Turner's Estate, 8o'Pa. Super. 88 (1923).
The judgment has been affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Nos. 273
and 274, January Term, 1923.
Under the Act of Congress approved December 13, 1913 (c. 6, sec. 1,
par. K, 38 Stats. 251; U. S. Comp. Stats., xgi8, s. 9794) as amended September 26, 1918 (40 Stats. 967, U. S. Comp. Stats., igi8, Supp. 9794 K) the
Federal Reserve Board is authorized and empowered "to grant by special
permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in contravention of
state or local law, the right to act as

. . . guardian of estates

.

.

Whenever the laws of such state authorize or permit the exercise of any or
all of the foregoing powers by state banks, trust companies, or other corporations which compete with national banks, the granting to and the exercise
of such powers by national banks shall not be deemed to be in contravention
of state or local law . . ." The Act of 1913 was declared constitutional
in National Bank of Bay City v, Fellows, 244 U. S. 416 (1917).

In an action of quo warranto the supreme court of a state can determine
whether the exercise of the given functions by a national bank is inconsistent
with the state law or not. National Bank v. Fellows, supra. -If a state
statute provides that no bank can be an administrator, a national bank cannot
exercise such a function in that state. Appeal of Woodbury et aL, 78 N. H.
,5, 96 AtL 299 (xgis). In construing the above quoted act and amendment
the state courts have all6wed a national bank to act as a fiduciary if competing corporations in the state are allowed to act as such in spite of state
statutory regulations with which national banks either could not or did not
comply. Under the following decisions a national bank was allowed to act
as a fiduciary: (r) where the state statute required that only a corporation could act as a fiduciary which was organized under provisions of a
certain stafe act, Estate of Stanchfield, 171 Wis. 553 (192o); (2) where the
statute required that a bank could not act as a trust company unless author-

*The following Recent Cases -are discussed in the Notes, supra: The
Minimum Wage Board of the District of Columbia v. The Children's Hospital, Supreme Court of the United States (not yet reported); Liberty
State Bank v. Metropolitan Church Association, 191 N. W. 414 (Minn. 1923) ;
Comm. v. Weinberg, 276 Pa. 255 (1923); People v. Gardiner, 303 Ill. 2a4
(.z=); Nusbaum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co, Supreme Court of Pennsylva-.
nia (not yet reported) ; Bell y. Little et at., x97 N. Y. S. 674 (App. Div. z923) ; .
Kelsey v. Kelsey, 197 N. Y. S. 371 (App. Div. 1923), and 'numerous cases
dealing with the doctrine of mutuality.
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ized by the state, Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Enright, 264 Fed. 236
(D. C. 192o) ; (3) where the statute provided that only a "suitable -person"
could act as a fiduciary, In re Mollineaux, I79 N. Y. S. go (Sup Ct. 1919);
(4) where a statute allowed a state bank to act as a guardian and made no
reference to national banks, Katherine Hamilton et al. v. Connecticut et al.,
94 Conn. 648, io Atl. 54 (i92o). The court in this case went so far as to
say that if a state allowed its banks to act as fiduciaries,.it could not prevent the national banks from so acting even by express legislation.
Since Pennsylvania permits state banks to act as fiduciaries, and since the
National Bank in the principal case agreed to comply with the state banking
laws, it would seem that the decision is correct.
CARRIERs--FREIGHT CHARGES-CONSIGNEE Wito DIRECTs DELIVERY TO ANOTHE.-The defendant, consignee of a car of lumber, wrote to the plaintiff
to deliver the car to the S. Co. upon payment of freight. The plaintiff accordingly delivered to the S. Co., but without collecting the freight. The latter
being insolvent, the plaintiff sought to recover from the defendant. Held:
For the plaintiff. The defendant's direction for delivery to another was a
sufficient assumption of ownership and acceptance of the carrier's services
to render it liable. New York Central R. R. Co. v. Ross Lumber Co., 137
N. E. 324 (N. Y. 1922).
On the sound theory that, since the shipper makes the contract of shipment, he is liable on that contract for services rendered in its performance,
a common carrier may recover its freight charges as well from the consignor as from the consignee. Wooster v. Tarr, 8 Allen (Mass.) 270 (1864);
Portland Flouring Mills Co. v. British etc. Ins. Co., 13o Fed. 86o (C. C. A.
i9o4). So, the consignor is liable even if the carrier's failure to collect from
the consignee was due to its own negligence. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v.
Montgomery, iiz S. E. 652 (Ga. App. i9n). And the -clause in a bill of
lading to deliver upon the consignee's paying the freight is for the benefit
of the carrier and cannot be taken advantage of by the consignor in an
action against him by the carrier for the freight. Collins v. Union Transp.
Co., io Watts (Pa.) 384 (i84o); Laying v. Stewart, z W. & S. (Pa.)
222

(i84).

If there is no contractual relation between the consignor and the consignee, the latter is, of course, not liable for the freight if he refuses to
accept the shipment. But if he does such an act of dominion over the
goods as would amount to an acceptance of them, he becomes liable for
their carriage charges. P. R. R. v. Titus, 216 N. Y. 17, iog N. E. 857 (1915) ;
If the consignee
Pittsburgh, etc. Ry. Co. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577 (1919).
ordered the goods or goods similar and the shipment was made in pursuance
of this order, he is liable for the freight even if he refuses to accept, because
he was the real principal directing the shipment. P. R. R. v. Descalzi, 59 Pa.
Super. 614 (1915); P. & R. Ry. Co. v. Parry, 66 Pa. Super. 49 (1917).
The principal case overrules Merian v. Funck, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 1o
(1847) and is cotstra to the general weight of authority. Tobin v. Crawford.
5 M,. & W. 235 (Eng. 1839) ; St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Browne Grain Co., j66
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S. W. 40 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Elliott, Railroads (3d ed.), Sec. 236t;
Hutchinson, Carriers (3d ed.), Sec. 8o8. Nevertheless, it seems to be the
better and more logical view. If the consignee ordered substantially the
same kind of goods as were shipped, he is, as indicated above, the real principal in employing the carrier and as such should be liable for the freight.
If he ordered no goods, he has, by directing the carrier to deliver them to
another and by their acceptance by the other, done such an act of dominion
over them as should make him liable for their carriage.
CONTRACrs-HUSBAND AND WIFE-AGREEMENTS TO SEPAATF.-A -wife
sued her husband on a written contract wherein it was set forth that, inasmuch as they had agreed to live apart, the husband promised to pay the
wife $2oo compensation for expenses to which she had been put in breaking
up her home in anticipation of marriage with him. Held: She could not
recover, because she had no right of action outside the contract, and the
contract was invalid because it was devoid of consideration and was part of
a separation agreement. Seelau v. Seelau, ig8 N. Y. S. 41 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
The court seems well justified in deciding that the plaintiff had no
right of action outside the contract at bar. No possible ground for a tort
action suggests itself, and the contract under which the plaintiff had incurred the expenses had been fully executed by the defendant when he
married her. Had she had a right of action in contract or for injuries to
property against the defendant, it would have survived the marriage, Clark
v. Clark, 49 Ill. App. 163 (x892); McKeown v. Lacey, 20o Mass. 437, 86
N. E. 799 (igog); MeKie v. McKie, x6 Ark. 68, 172 S. W. 891 (igr4),
under the Married Women's Property Acts, which have changed the Common Law, at which all choses in action between the spouses were extinguished by their union in marriage. Dillon v. Dillon, 24 Ky. Law 78r, 69
S. W. io99 (xgo2); Schouler, Domestic Relations (6th ed.), 545, 669.
Under -the Married Women's Acts contracts between spouses are permitted, Bea v. People, ioi Ill. App. 132 (igoi); Hoeck v. Grief, I42 Cal. 119,
75 Pac. 67o (igo4); Rogers v. Rogers, x86 N. Y. App. 77, 174 N. Y. S.24
(igig), but they must be supported by good consideration. Greene v. Greene,
42 Neb. 634, 6o N. W. 937 (i894); Gouge v. Gouge, 26 N. Y. App. Div. 154,
49 N. Y. S. 879 (1898). The contract at bar was not so supported. 'The
plaintiff had surrendered no right of action and had suffered nothing in
consequence of the contract sued on. It was not alleged that the defendant
had been benefited by getting rid of her.
The court added another ground, however, which seems to have been
neither necessary nor proper-that the contract was part of an agreement to
separate. This was hardly true because the contract at bar was not part of a
separation agreement-it merely mentioned one as being already in existence.
Moreover, although contracts promotive of divorce are everywhere invalid,
Sayles v. Sayles, 21 N. H. 312 (i85o) ; Storey v. Storey, 125 I1. 6o8, z8 N. E.
329 (i888) ; Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. I, 1o3 Pac. 488 (igog),

contracts for

separation are generally .held valid when supported by good consideration. Walker v. Walker, 76 U. S. 743 (z869); Bailey v. Dillon, 186 Mass.
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244, 71 N. E. 538 (z9o4); Singer's Estate, 233 Pa. 55, 81 At. 898 (igii).
On grounds of public policy such contracts are not enforceable in a few
states, Baum v. Baum, io9 Wis. 47, 8 5 N. W. x22 (19o1 ; Hill v. Hill, 74 N.
H. 288, 67 At. 4o6 (i9o7); Gray v. Butler, i6 N. Y. App. Div. 8x6, 102 N.
Y. S. io6 (ipo7), but there would not seem to be any weighty objection
to an agreement under which neither party claims the right to remarry or
to be released from his obligations to spouse or children.
CORPORATION---PGHT OF COURT TO ENTERTAIN PLEADINGS FILED BY PRESIDENT OF CORPORATION IN HANDS ce REcEIvE-TFmPoEAay SPECIFIC PERFORM-

ANcE.-The plaintiff corporation filed a bill for the appointment of a receiver of. the defendant corporation. One was appointed and the property
was transferred to him. The president of the defendant corporation, who
was also the owner of half its stock, filed in answer, to the bill in the defendant's name, without authority. A cross bill was also filed praying specific performance of a contract made with the plaintiff. The court dismissed the receiver and ordered temporary specific performance for an
indefinite period in order to observe the behavior of the parties. The plaintiff appealed from the decree. Held: Decree dismissing receiver and granting temporary specific performance reversed: Schipper Bros. Coal Mining
Co. v. Economy Domestic Coal Co., Supreme -Court of Pennsylvania, No.
223, Ja. Term, i94.
Although the appointment of a receiver does not mean that a corporation is dissolved, Ohio etc. R. Co. v. Russell, 115 Ill. $2, 3 N. E. 561 (1885);
Chemical Nat'l Bank v. Hartford Co., i6i U. S. 1 (1896); Sigua Iron Co.
v. Brown, 171 N. Y. 488, 6 4 N. E. x94 (i9o2), it does have the effect of
suspending all of the corporate officers, who may no longer interfere with
the business. Lenoir v. Linville Imp. Co., 126 N. C. 92w, 36 S. B. i85
(xgoo).
The directors and officers are deprived of control -over corporate property and it then becomes vested in the receiver. Rochester v.
Bronson, 41 Hqw. Pr. 78 (N. Y. 1871); Peck v. Southwestern Lumber etc.
Co., 131 La. 177, 59 So. 113 (1912) ; Blum Brothers v. Girard Na±'l Bank, zjS
Pa. 148 (igxs), 93 AtI. 940. Some courts have stated that an appointment
of a receiver may be regarded as an injunction forbidding the officers and
agents of the corporation from exercising any dominion over corporate property and affairs, or from intermeddling with them in any way. Gravenstine's Appeal, 49 Pa. 3o (865); Lenoir v. Linville Imp. Co., supra; Treat
v. Insurance Co., 19 Pa. 326, 49 At. 84 (igol). So it seems clear that the
court had no right to entertain the answer and cross bill filed in the defendant's name by the company's president. The control over the corporate.
property was vested in the receiver and remained so until the court might

see fit to modify its decree appointing him or dismiss him altogether. As the
Supreme Court said, the president was entitled to file a stockholder's bill
of course, but instead he presumed to come before the court as the defend-

ant's president, acting on behalf of the defendant, and as. such, therefore,
should not have been beard.
Again the decree of the lower court was unusual and without legat prece-
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dent in that it ordered temporary specific performance and denied a final decree until opportunity could be had to observe the conduct of the parties
with relation to the interlocutory order. If entitled at all to specific performance a final decree should have been rendered for the defendant, since
specific performance of a contract is given as a substitute for the legal
remedy of compensation, Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.), Vol. 1V,
Sec. 1401; Wilson v. Northampton etc. Ry. L R. 9 Ch. App. 279 (1874)
which never assumes a temporary character.
EVIDENcE-ADMissiimLTy OF PHYSICIAN'S OPINION AS TO PosITIoN or
PARTIES, AND DmcToN AND DISTANCE OF Snor.-On an indictment for murder, the Commonwealth offered the opinion evidence of a physician, who was
qualified as an expert, and who had examined the deceased's wounds, as to
the position of the parties at the time of the shooting, and the direction and
distance of the shot. The evidence was admitted and upon appeal this was
assigned as error. Held: The evidence was admissible (but conviction reversed on other grounds). Commonwealth v. Santos, 275 Pa. 515, 19 At.
596 (1923).
"In the main, any rule excluding opinion evidence is limited to cases
where, in the judgment of the court, it will not be helpful to the jury. ....
It is obvious that such a principle must allow a very great range of permissible difference in judgment." Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence,
525. The cases exhibit "a very great range of . . . difference in judgment." In some jurisdictions, opinion evidence as to the position of the
parties, and the direction and distance of the shot, is uniformly excluded,
on the ground that the jury is as capable of drawing correct inferences as
an expert or one who has knowledge of the facts at first hand: Foster v.
State, 70 Miss. 755, 12 So. 822 (1893); Price v. U. S., 2 Ol . Cr. 449, ioi Pac.
1o36 (i9o9); Matthis v. State, IS Ala. App. 245, 73 So. 122 (igx6); Clark
v. State, 91 So. 328 (Ala. App. 192-). The last-named case contains a dictum
that evidence as to range of shot is admissible. In other jurisdictions opinion evidence, given by a qualified physican who examined the wounds, is excluded as to the relative position of the parties, but admitted as to the direction from which the blow came. Kennedy.v. People, 39 N. Y. 245 (1868);
Perkins v. State, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 597 (189i); Brown v. State, 55 Ark.
593, 18 S. W. io51 (1892) ; People v. Hawes, 98 Cal. 648, 33 Pac. 791 (1893);
People v. Milner, 122 Cal. 171, 54 Pac. 833 (I88).
The weight of authority, however, considers such evidence as helpful to
the jury and, hence, admissible. Of these jurisdictions, the majority regard
the evidence as capable of being given only by one who personally examined
the wound, and who is a qualified expert, such as a physician: (as to position of the parties) State v. Cross, 68 Iowa Io, 26 N. W. 62 (885) ; State
v. Sullivan, 43 S. C. 205, 21 S.E. 4 (894 ; State v. Buralli, 27 Nev. 41, 71
Pac. 532 (i9o3); Miera v. Territory, 13 New Mex. 192, 81 Pac. 86 (z905);
(as to direction of the shot), State v. Merriman, 34 S. C. i6, j2 S. E. 619
(i8go) ; Perry v. State, Ilo Ga. 234, 36 S. E. 781 (I9OO); (as to distance),
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Boyd v. State, 82 Tenn. (14 Lea) 16I (1894) ; Preeper v. Queen, I5 Can. Sup.
Ct. Rep. 4oz (1888) ; State v. Johns, 152 Iowa 383, 132 N. W. 832 (r91r);
or such as one having special knowledge of wounds or deadly weapons:
State v. Jones, 4T Kan. 309, 21 Pac. 265 (1889) (as to distance) ; or such as
a physician with spicial knowledge of firearms: State v. Asbell, 57 Kan.
398, 46 Pac. 770 (1896)

(as to distance) ; Comm. v. Dorr, 216 Mass. 314, 103

N. E. 9o2 (914) (as to position). In an important case, however, the opinion evidence of one who had merely examined the wound, but who had no
expert knowledge, was declared admissible as to the direction from which the
shot came. Hopt v. Utah, i2o U. S. 430 (1887).
The question raised in the principal case appears to have been passed on
only once before in Pennsylvania, in a ruling in the trial court, which reached
the same conclusion: Comm. v. Lenox, 3 Brewst. 249 (1867). The principal
case seems to follow the weight of authority both in admitting the opinion
evidence, and in its dictum that the person giving such opinion must be a
qualified expert.

HOMIciD--EVmENcE-ADMISSBLIITY OF TESTIMONY AS TO THE REPUTADECE.ASED.-The defendant, on a trial for murder and under a

TION OF THE

plea of self-defense, testified that the deceased had made a murderous assault upon him, and produced witnesses who, while not called to establish
the bad reputation of the deceased, gave evidence "tending to show that the
latter was a bad and dangerous man." In rebuttal, the Commonweilth was
permitted to introduce evidence of the reputation of the deceased as a
peaceable and law-abiding citizen. To this evidence the defendant excepted. Held: Judgment affirmed. Commonwedlth v. Castellana, Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, No. 31, Oct. Term, x9.
In general, proof of the character or reputation of the deceased is inadmissible in homicide cases. Comm. v. Hilliard, 2 Gray. (Mass.) 294
(1854); Comm. v. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. 386 (1863); People v. Webster, I39 N.
Y. 73 (1893). But the defendant may introduce it when he admits the killing and gives evidence of self-defense. Franklin v. State, 29 Ala. r4
(1856) ; State v. Turner, 29 S. C. 34, 9 S. B. 891 (1888); Garner v. Florida,
28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891). The state cannot introduce primary evidence
of the good reputation of the deceased. Pound v. State, 43 Ga. 88 (18"1);
Kennedy v. State, 14o Ala. 1, 37 So. 90 (:9o4) ; Melton v. State, 47 Tex. (Cr.
App.) 451, 83 S. W.'822 (1904).

As to what constitutes a sufficient attack on the deceased's reputation to
allow the prosecution to combat it on rebuttal, there is a divergence of opinion. In two jurisdictions, evidence of self-defense, without more, is enough.
Thrawley v. State, 153 Ind. 375, 55 N. B. 9 (1899); State v. Wilkins, 72
Ore. 77, 142 Pac. 589 (19T4); State v. Holbrook, 98 Ore. 43, 192 Pac. 64o
(192o). But in the latter Oregon case the court said that although they felt
bound to adopt it, the rule stated in State v. Wilkins was too broad. The
great majority of jurisdictions requires something more than mere evidence of
self-defense. State v. Potter, 13 Kan- 414 (1874); Carr v. State, 21 Ohio
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C. C. 43, 11 Ohio C. D. 353 (igoo); Kelly v. People, 229 Ill. 81, 82 N. E.
198 (i9o7). Evidence that the deceased was a "large and strong man" was
held not enough. Carr v. State, supra. Likewise, evidence that the deceased was "quarrelsome, brutal, and abusive toward his family." Childers v.
Comm., 16I Ky. 44o, 171 S.W. 149 (1914).
But it has been generally held

not necessary that the defendant produce direct evidence of the deceased's bad
reputation. If he show such specific acts that the jury must infer the deceased was a dangerous mdn, the state can rebut it. State v. Vacos, 40 Utah
i69, 12o Pac. 497 0i911). And similarly where it "kas shown that the deceased was of a "quarrelsome, morose, irritable, vindictive disposition,"
People v. Gallagher, 75 App. Div. 39, 78 N. Y. S.5, aff. in 174 N. Y. SoS,
66 N. E. Ir3 (i9o2); or a "good man in a fight," Davis v. People, 114 Ill.

86, 29 N. E. 192 (1885); or that the deceased had been in several shootings. State v. Lejeune, 116 La. 194, 40 So. 632 (:go6).
The principal case-one of first impression in Pennsylvania-falls within
this latter rule that, while mere evidence of self-defense is not enough, it is
not necessary that the defendant should have produced direct evidence of the
deceased's repuation for being dangerous to permit the state to prove, his
peaceableness.

HUSBAND

AND

WIFE-CRIMINAL

CONvERsATioN-RIGRT

OF ACTION

IN

W iE.-The plaintiff, a woman whose husband had had sexual intercourse
with the defendant, sued the latter for criminal conversation. Under the
Married Woman's Property Act of the jurisdiction a married woman had

the right to sue as if unmarried for injury "to her person, property or character or for an injury arising out of the marital relation." Held: (Merrel, J.,
dissenting) : The action cannot be maintained. Oppenheim v. Kridel, ig8 N.
Y. S. i57 (App. Div. 1923).

Although a husband at common law had the right to sue his wife's
paramour for having had sexual intercourse with her, 3 BI. Comm. 139
(Lewis' Ed., :902), a wife had no corresponding right against the woman
guilty of the criminal conversation with her husband. Kroessin v. Keller, 6o
Minn. 372, 62 N. W. 438 (i895); Lawry v. Lawry, 2o Ont. Law Rep. 162
(i90:). The question whether the various Women's Property Acts have had
any effect upon the inability of a married woman to sue for criminal conversation depends upon what theory the courts assign to the common law
denial of that right. Some declare that the only reason why a woman could
not sue her husband's seductress was a procedural one. In suits at common law it was always necessary to join the husband and any damages
recovered belonged to him. I BI. Comm. 442-445 (Sharswood's Ed., 1866).
The action, therefore, could not be sustained because it would allow a husband to profit by his own wrongdoing. Since now, however, a married
woman can sue and own property, the procedural bars are lowered and the
right which had always existed can be exercised. Dodge v. Rush, 28 App. D.
C. 149 (i9o6) ; Nolin v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N. E. 89o (i9o6) ; Parker
v. Newman, 2o Ala. 103, 75 So. 479 (1917); Turner v. Heavrin, 182 Ky.
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65, 2o6 S. W. 23 (igi8). This was the view of the dissenting opinion
in the principal case.
On the other hand, the. view of the majority in the principal case is
often taken, by which the wife never had a right which was repressed or in
abeyance by reason of procedural restriction, and, therefore, the Married
Woman's Acts cannot aid her. These acts generally do not confer new
rights of action, but only allow a feme covert to sue alone wherever previously her husband had to be joined. Doe v. Roe, 8z Me. 5o3, 2o AtI. 83
(i8go) ; Ellis v. Lambert, 24 Ont. App. Rep. 653 (1895); Kroessin v. Keller,
supra. Various reasons are mentioned to show that the wife had not even
an abstract right to sue for criminal conversation. While the adultery of the
wife may force the husband to support illegitimate children, and may cast
discredit upon the legitimacy of the children actually his, there is no such
danger to the wife when the husband is guilty of adultery. Moreover, it-is
often the case that the woman having the criminal conversation with the husband was herself seduced and suffered even more than the complaining wife.
Kroessin v. Keller, jupra.
While it may be true that a husband is injured to a greater degree by
the adultery of his wife than a wife is by that of her husband, a right of
recovery ought, nevertheless, to be accorded to the wife. The civil institution
of marriage is treated as i contract between the parties, and it is difficult to
understand as a matter of abstract right how a husband can demand the
right of exclusive marital aid and affection while the wife has no equivalent
right. if the action is conducive to more harm than good, .as was alleged
in the principal case, it ought to be abolished for both husband and wife as
was done in England. 2o and 21 Vict., C. 85, sec. 59.

LIBEL AND

SLANDER-DEFAMATRY

WRITTEN

STATEMENT

MADE TO CMC

LEAGuE.-The defendant, a member of a Civic League which was incorporated for the purpose of elevating public sentiment along. moral lines,
falsely wrote to this league that the plaintiff was keeping girls for immoral
purposes. Held (Hinman, J., dissenting) : The statement was not a qualified
privilege. Pecue v. Collins, 197 N. Y. S. 835 (App. Div., x923).
An analysis of the principal case reveals: (i) that there was no legal
duty to communicate this matter; (2) that there-was no community of interest between the party making the statement and the one about whomn it
was made; and (3) that it was not made to protect the party making it.
"The law does not permit a mere volunteer to publish his opinions in defamation of another with impunity, simply because he means well by doing so."
Shurtleff v. Parker, 130 Mass. 293 (i88i); Morse v. Printing Co., x24 Iowa
The communication might be privileged if made to such a
7o (0o4).
League. concerning one of its own members because there then would be a
commutinity of interest. Shurtleff v. Stevens, 5i Vt. 5o (1879); Kirkpatrick
v. Eagle Lodge, 26 Kan. 384. (i88i); McKnight v. Hasbrouck, 17 R. I. 7o
2o AtL 95 (i89o). In the nek'cantil agency cases the defense of qualified
privilege has been allowed it the statements have not been published in a
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report for general circulation. Eber v. Dun, T2 Fed. 526 (C. C. 1882); Pol.
lasky v. Minchener, 81 Mich. 280, 46 N. W. 5 (i89o); Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., x6 Mo. 226, 22 S. W. 358, 724 (1893). See the cases-collected
in II Bohlen, Cases on Torts, io8o. Communications to a sheriff are privileged, while he is engaged in hunting for culprits. Beshiers v. Allen, 46
But they must be made for the purpose
Okla. 331, 148 Pac. 141 (1975).
of having a criminal detected and brought to punishment. Stewart v.
Major, 17 Wash. 238, 49 Pac. 5o3 (1897).
The majority of the judges in the principal case thought that the party
to wlom the defendant made the communication had no more privilege before the law than any other person. The dissenting opinion proceeds *on
the reasoning that there was a moral or social duty; that several persons
may lawfully meet and consult to prosecute a guilty person; and associations to prosecute felons are lawful. Ylnck v. Colby, 46 N. Y. 427, 433
(1871) ; Rex v. Murray, Matth. Dig. Cr. Law go (Eng. 1833); Reg. v.
Best, i Salk. i74 (Eng. 1795). It is to be observed, however, that the Civic
League was not an organ ization for the prosecution of felons.
LiMITATION OF AcrboNs-PROCEEDINGS IN RELIANCE UPoN UNcoNsTzrT-

STATum-.The plaintff's intestate on May 20, igi8, while employed
in maritime work, received injuries from which he died. His widow, the
plaintiff, relying upon an Act of Congress which validated such awards, accepted compensation under the New York Workmen's Compensation Law.
On October 15, igao, the Federal act was held unconstitutional and the
State Industrial Commission terminated the payments. An action at law for
the wrongful death was then brought by the plaintiff against the employer, to
which the defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations. Held: for the defendant. Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 198 N. Y. S. 99 (App.
Div. z9Z3).
An unconstitutional statute, although having the name and form of law,
is wholly void. Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, i Doug. 225 (Mich.
1844); Ex Porte Siebold, zoo U. S. 371 (x879) ; Bonnell v. Vallier, 13o Wis.
It seems logical, therefore, that proceedings
193, 1i6 N. W. 885 (i9o8).
brought under such a statute could have no effect in tolling the statute of
limitations. No authority can be cited for this, however, as the instant case
appears to be the first case on record disposing of the point. Although
the decision for the defendant appears to be right, nevertheless as the court
the equities are all with the plaintiff." It seems particusaid: "...
larly harsh to hold the Statute of Limitations a bar to her common law
remedy, when she has been diligent and has availed herself under the
Workmen's Compensation Law of what purported to be her only remedy,
and one which the State Industrial Commission and sixteen judges had.'adjudged to be a constitutional one. The only relief from such an unfortunate circumstance, the court suggested, is a legislative enactment allowing recovery to such claimants, in spite of the Statute of Limitations.
TIONAL
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FoR ERRORS CoMMiTrED BY CouRTs.-

The court, after deciding that the action was one for its equity side, refused
the request of the defendants for a jury trial. Thereafter the- court
concluded that error- had been committed in refusing a jury trial,
and upon its own motion, and without deciding the case on its merits, ordered a new trial. This order was eitra-judicial. The relators applied to
the state Supreme Court for a mandamus to compel the inferior court to
proceed to a decision. Held: Mandamus granted. State ex- rel. Mingo v.
'
District Court of Le Sueur et al., i9i N. W. 416 (Minn. 192z).
to strike out the name of
motion
defendant's
The court refused on the
one of the parties plaintiff. The relators applied for a mandamus to compel
the inferior court to strike out such name. Held: Mandamus is not the
proper remedy. State ex rel. Kratche v. Civil Court of Milwaukee County,
xg"N. W. _o7 (Wis.,1923).
One of the ancient offices of the writ of mandamus' was to compel action by lower judicial tribunals rt specting matters properly before them and
within their jurisdiction. See High, Extraordinary Remedies 5 (3d ed., z896).
While ordinarily the writ will issue only where the act to be enforced is a
purely ministerial one, it will also be used to compel an inferior court to
take jurisdiction and to proceed in the due exercise thereof. State v. Eddy,
10 Mont. 31r, 25-Pac. io32' (i8 ); In re Hohorst, iso U. S. 653 (1893);
Wheeling etc. Ry. Co. v.' Paull, 39 W. Va. 142, i9 S. E. 551 (1894). Where
a court, therefore, has wrongfully dismissed an action, because, in its opinion, based on a mistake of law, it has no jurisdiction therein, the, writ will
issue. State vi. Hlunter, 3 Wash. 92, 27 Pac. io76 (i89i) ; Kelsey -v. Church,
In some cases, a distinc112 N. Y. App. Div. 4o8, 98 N. Y.. S. 535 (19o6).
tion 'is made between a refusal to take jurisdiction, ab initio, and a judicial
determination that there is no jurisdiction,-a writ of mandamus being allowed in the former case but not in the -latter. People v. Garnett, i3o Ill.
340, 23 N. E. 331 (i88); State v. Smith, io5 Mo. 6, 16 S. W. io52 (i89i).
While the writ of mandamus may be issued to compel the inferior court to
exercise its discretion, it will not compel the 'Court to decide a matter in any
particular manner, its mandate' being merely that the judge or court before
whom'i .cause is pending shall proceed to hear and determine it one way
or the other. Ex parte Alabama State Bar Assn., 92 Ala. 1i3, 8 So. 768
(x8o) ; Speckert v. Ray, 7g S. W. 592 (Ky. i915), discussed in 64 U. OF
PA.-'L. REv. 4o6 (1915-i916).

The writ of mandamus, being an extraordi-

nary remedy, will not be issued -to perform the office of an appeal or writ
of error. Whenever another remedy may be used a writ of mandamus will
never issue. In re Morrison, 147 U. S. 14 (1893); In re Key, 189 U. S. 84
(i9o2). It seems that neither Federal nor state: courts will issue mandamus
to ' the courts or judicial officers of each other. In-re Blake, etc., 175 U. S.
"
114 (1899); 26 Cyc. 104.
law, there be a
of
a
mistake
to
It may be said, therefore, that if, due
refusal to act Upon the subject on which discretion is to be exercised, the
writ may be granted to 'enforce action, as in the Mingo case, supra, but when
the question has been passed upon and it has, been within the discretion of
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the court so to act, mandamus will not be issued for the purpose of correcting the decision, as in the Kratche case, supra.
Mandamus in Pennsylvania is now regulated by the Act of June 8, 1893,
P. L 345. See Comm. v. Hattel, 4 Pa. Super. 95 (1897).

MASTER AND SERVANT-SUDDEN
PLOY A

EMERGENCY-IMPLIED AUTHORITY TO EM-

SUBSTITUTE.-The defendant's servant, a teamster, without authority

asked his friend, who was not a fellow employee, to assist him in delivering a
heavy package. The package was delivered, but before the servant had obtained his receipt, a traffic policeman ordered him to move his truck Not
wishing to leave his master's goods unguarded, the servant directed his
friend to move the truck as ordered. In so doing the servant's friend lost
control of the truek and the plaintiff was injured. The plaifitiff in an action for damages was non-suited. Held: Judgment reversed and a venire de
novo awarded. Kirk v. Showell, Frier & Co., Inc., No. 63, Jan. Term,
i923-Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Speaking generally, a servant in the absence of express authority, cannot,
by transferring the performance of his duties to another person, create the
relation of master and servant between his employer and the transferee so
as to bind the former for the latter's tortious acts. Haluptzok v. Great
Northern R. Co., 55 Minn. 446, 57 N V. 144 (1893) ;. Tyssen v. Davenport
Ice etc. Co., 134 Iowa 749, 112 N. W. 177 (1907). Except in New York
the master is not liable where the servant delegates a particular duty in its
entirety to a stranger, and is not present and does not co-operate in the performance of the duty by the latter. Hills v. Strong, 132 Ill. App. 174
(1907) ; White v. Levi, 137 Ga. 269, 73 S. E. 376 (19ti) ; but see Althorf v.

Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355 (i86o), a leading case. See, also, Cooper V. Lowry, 4
Ga. App. 12o, 6o S. E. iotS (igo8), which goes to the other extreme. But
when the servant co-operates in the negligent act, the master cannot escape
liability upon the ground that the servant was assisted in the work by a third
person. Andrews v. Bordecker, 126 Ill. 6o5, 18 N. E. 651 (1888); Hollidge v.
Duncan, i99 Mass. 121, 85 N. E. 186 (igo8); but see Cooper- v. Lowry,
supra.
The general rule mentioned at the beginning of this discussion is subject to one important qualification, viz., that if the delegation of a servant's
duty appears to be the only available means of preserving the interests of
his master from serious detriment and it is impossible for him to communicate with or ascertain the wishes of his master, he is deemed to be an
"agent of necessity" for the purpose of engaging another person to act as
substitute. I Labatt, Master & Servant 345 (1913). The leading case on
this point is Gwilliam v. Twist, 2 Q. B. (C. A.) 84 (Eng. i895). There the.
plaintiff was injured by the negligence of a man who had taken the place
of the driver of an omnibus, after the latter had been ordered by a policeman, on account of his supposed drunken condition, to stop driving. The
Court of Appeal was unanimous in holding that the "doctrine of authority by
necessity" was not applicable under such circumstances as there was noth-
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ing to show that the omnibus might not have remained safely where it was
until the master could 'be informed as to what had happened. "In the principal case the defendant's package could have been guarded by the assistant,
while the servant himself moved the truck. A review of the authorities would
seem to indicate that the court might well have sustained the nonsuit on the
grounds that (I) the stranger's act was entirely independent of the servant's
control, and (2) the evidence would not warrant a finding that there was an
emergency. See 3 MIcH. L REv. i98 (1z94-o5).
NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OWED TO PRsoNs COMING ON PREMIsEs FR INSPECOwNE.-A boat owned and controlled by the defendant company was overloaded and capsized while crossing a swollen river,
causing the death of the plaintiff's husband, who was one of a party of invitees on its way to inspect the defendant's factory. The boat was used as
a part of plant to convey employes, and others having business with the
firm, across the river. The plaintiff brought action for damages. Held:
(Frazer, Kephart and Schaffer, JI., dissenting): The defendant company
was liable. Corbin v. Haws Refactories Co., No. 228, Jan. Term, 1923, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
It will be found that the distinction between a visitor who is a mere
licensee and one who is on the premises by invitation turns on the nature of
the business that brings him there, rather than on the words or acts of
the owner that precede his coming. Pomponio v. New York elc. R. R.,
66 Conn. 528, 34 Ad. 491 (i8g5). The duty to one who comes on the
premises by the owner's invitation to transact business in which the -parties
are mutually interested, is to exercise reasonable care for his safety, while
on that part of the premises required for the purpose of the visit. Paucknor v. Wakem, 231 IlL 276, 83 N. E. 20o (i9o7); Robb v. Niles-BementPond Co., 269 Pa. 298, 112 AtL 459 (192i). The plaintiff's business need
not be directly profitable to the owner; it is enough that it be connected with
and incidental to the business conducted on the premises as, for example,
customhouse officer on. steamboat wharf, Low v. Grand Trunk R. R., 72
Me. 313 (1881); hackman bringing passengers to station, Tobin v. R.
R., 53 Me. x83 (1871); woman serving meals at station to mail
clerks on the defendant's trains, I11.Cent. R. R. v. Hopkins, 2oo IlL i22, 65
N. E.'656 (902) ; man going to station to meet his wife, a passenger, Hamilton v. R. R., 64 Tex. 25! (i885). As to the status of persons on the
premises to inspect the plant, there aire only two authorities in both of which
the visitors were held to be mere licensees, but in those cases an invitation
was not extended but permission was asked and granted, no benefit accrued
to the owners and the privilege extended was solely for the benefit and pleasure of the guest. Benson v. Baltimore Traction Co., 77 Md. 535, 26 At. 973
(1893) ; Weaver v. Carnegie Steel Co., 223 Pa. 238, 72 At. 553 (199). In
the principal case the inspecting party was an association of foremen of
several plants of which the defendant company was one. A benefit might
well be found in such case, as these inspection trips were regulated and
financed by the manufacturers themselves for the improvement of their
business.
TION WITH CONSENT OF

RECENT CASES
The majority of the court based their decision on the general principle
that where one has asked, or by implication induced another to come upon
his premises, he owes that other a duty to see that they are in a reasonably
safe condition and if injury occurs by reason of failure to exercise the
proper care, the owner is liable for the damages sustained. 2o R. C. L. 55;
Robb v. Niles-Bement-Pond- Co., supra. Whether or not this principle
should be extended to cases where the injury was sustained while on the
way to, but before reaching, the defendant's premises is uncertain. In this
regard the principal case is one of first impression.
PATENTs-NAT-RE OF INTERESTs REcmvun

UNDER ASSiGNMENTS.-The

plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from infringing upon a patent issued to the Reed Manufacturing Co. The Reed Manufacturig Co. had
executed an instrument purporting to assign to the plaintiff all of its rights
.under said patent as against the defendant. Held: The plaintiff could not
maintain the action, since the instrument was invalid either as an assignment
of a part of the patent right or as an assignment of a chose in action.
Crown Die and Tool Co. v. Nye Tool Machine Works, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2U
(Feb. 1J923).

Patent law is the manifestation of a policy having its first expression in
the Constitution (art and science clause in Art. I, Sec. 8). All that has
been deemed necissary to carry out this policy so far as inventions are Cancerned has been to provide for an exclusive right to inventors to make,
use and vend their products. Paper Bag Patent Case, 210 U. S.405 (1907).
The common law rule is that the invention gives to the inventor the absolute and exclusive property of the idea he has conceived, until he communicates it to others. I Robinson, Patents, 37 (1890); 3 id. 26&; Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. 646, 674 (U. S. 1846). The patent gives to the inventor the
exclusive property right after the externalized idea has been communicated.
Seymour v. Osborne, ii Wall Sx6 (U. S. i87o); Cammeyer v. Newton, 94
U. S. 225 0876); Dcnsmore v. Scofield, 102 U. S.375, 378'(88o). Chief
Justice Taft said in principal case: "The patent confers on such common
law right the incident of exclusive enjoyment and it is the -common law right
with this incident which a patentee or assignee must have."
The monopoly guaranteed by the patent is in its nature one entire thing.
The patentee may assign, either, first, the whole patent comprising the exclusive right to make, use and vend the article throughout the United States,
or, second, an individual share of that exclusive right, or, third, the exclusive right within and throughout a specified part of the United States. In
the first and third cases, title is in the assignee alone; in the second case,
title is in the assignor and the assignee jointly. Any transfer, short of"one
of these, is a license, giving the assignee no title td the patent and no right
to sue at law in his own name for an infringement Waterman v. Mackenzie,
138 U. S. 252, 255 (x89o); Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully Manufac-

turing Co., 144 U. S.248 (i89i); Act of July 8, 187o; Act of March, 3, 1897.
The grant of an exclusive right to make and vend an article within a certain
territory upon paying to the assignor a cent per pound, reserving to the as-
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signor the right to use and manufacture the article by paying to the assignee a cent per pound, was held to be merely a license. Gayler v. Wilder,
io How. 477 (U. S. I85o).
In the principal case, to the inventor's common law right was given the
incident of the patent, creating a monopoly and depriving others of their
right to make, use and vend the article. The incident was void, however,
without the common law right to which it might attach. When the Reed
Manufacturing Co. attempted to assign the right to exclude the defendant,
that could attach to nothing, since the. Reed Co. did not assign the common
law right to make, use and vend the article; and the grant of the letters
patent had deprived the plaintiff of any common law right to make the
article which it otherwise would have had.

SALES ACT-STATUTE OF FRAUDs--CoNFIRMATION OF AN ORAL CONTRACT
BY A Wrr-N REPUDIATION THEREOF.-The defendant ordered by telephone
a quantity of lumber, the value of which exceeded $Soo, and the plaintiff sent
him a confirmation in writing, setting forth the description of the lumber,
price and terms. The defendant then orally cancelled "the order" and confirmed the cancellation by letter, referring to the plaintiff's confirmation. Upon
suit for breach of contract, the defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds
which provided that such contracts "shall not be enforceable by action ...
unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be
signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf." (Uniform
Sales Act, sec. 4; Act of May i9,1915, P. L. 543.) The plaintiff claimed
that the statute was satisfied by the defendant's letter. Held: The statute
was not satisfied. Lippincott v. Stringer, So Pa. Super. 162 (1922).
The principle is well established that the Statute of Frauds is satisfied
by a writing or several connected writings which contain all the essential
elements of the preceding oral contract that would otherwise come within
it. See Williston, Sales, secs. 100-117; 27 C. J. secs. 3o4-386. It is immaterial with what purpose the writing which satisfies the statute was made.
Williston, Sales, sec. io6. Thus it is satisfied by a writing which, after
acknowledging the oral contract, expressly repudiates it, Campbell v. Mahiler, 43 Ont. L. Rep. 395 (i918); Lawley v. Buff, 23o Mass. 21, 179 N. E.
186 (1918); Mayer v. Hirsch, Stein & Co., 212 I1. App. 44z (i99); or
cancels a part thereof: Myers v. Harris, io4 N. Y. S. 514 (i9o7); or disclaims liability under it: Dewar v. Mintoft, L R. (1912) 2 K. B. 33; or
denies the authority of the agent who made it: Spiegel v. Lowenstein, 147 N.
Y. S. 655, 162 App. Div. 443 (1914); Martin v. Haubner, 26 Can. S. C. 142
(1896). It has been held, however, that the writing must admit the oral
contract. Upton Mills v. Baldwin Mills, 147 Minn. 2o5, 179 N. V. 9o4
(192o); dicta in Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie, 27/o Pa. 221, 224, 113 Atl.
-02 (1921). A memorandum, therefore, that refers to and treats the transaction merely as an unaccepted order,"which it then expressly cancels or revokes, has been held not to satisfy the statute. Wilson v. Lewiston -Mill Co.,
150 N% Y. 314 (1896); Spiegel v. Lowenstein, supra. Cf. Porter v. Patter-
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son, 42 Ind. App. 404, 85 N. E. 797 (igo8). But see Elliott v. Dean, I Cab. &
El. 283 (Eng. 8&O. Similarly, a writing which admits the making of an
oral contract but contends that the written memorandum of it submitted does
not embody all the terms, or that they were different, does not satisfy the
statute. Harby v. Wilson. io6 S. C. 7, 90 S. E.. 183 (1916); Cox v. Hoare,
95 Law Times R. (N. S.) 121 (Eng. i9o6); Turkill v. Cambi, L. R. (igig),
2 K. B. 59o; see 27 C. J., sec. 317.
Although the wording of this section of the Statute of Frauds differs in
some states, the courts have generally interpreted it as though it read "not
9ig
(S. C. i921 ; Porter
enforceable." Kirkpatrick v. Hardeman, Iio S. E.
v. Patterson, supra; Williston, Sales, secs. 7t and 126. In the absence of a
memorandum in writing, the oral contract exists with all its legal consequences, but it is merely unenforceable. Taylor v. Great Eastern Railway,
L R. (1901) x K. B. 774, 779.
The principal case, which is de novo in Pennsylvania, presents a slightly
different state of facts from most of the above in that the defendant "cancelled" the oral transaction before confirming the cancellation by the writing, upon which the plaintiff relied to satisfy the statute. The Superior
Court seems to emphasize this fact as one of the three grounds of its decision, which were: (I) That "as it was up to that time [of the written
confirmation] an enforceable contract, he [the defendant] was within his
right to cancel it." But since an oral contract before the writing is good
for all purpose except enforcement, it is difficult to see how it can be
cancelled except by mutual consent of both parties. Taylor v. Great Eastern Ry., supra. It should make no difference therefore that it was cancelled'
by one party before the writing which confirmed the oral cancellation was'
sent. (2) That "the defendant had a different purpose in view than the
acknowledgment of the contract." But the intention of the defendant in making the memorandum makes no difference as above indicated. (3) The Court
shifts from considering this writing as a repudiation of a contract and
treats it as "a repudiation in writing of an oral order."
It is submitted that the decision can be supported only on the third
theory, that the defendant in his letter did not admit the making of any
contract, but merely cancelled what he considered was an unaccepted offer.

TAXATION-RIGHTS

OF BOARDS OF EQUALIZATION

AND

REVISION TO IN-

CREASE VALUATION OF PROPERTY.-After the local assessors had valued and
assessed the taxable properties in their districts, the county commissioners,
acting as a board of revision, appointed other persons to make proper valuations. The plaintiffs, contending that the proceedings of the commissioners
were illegal, brought a bill in equity to enjoin any action founded upon the
report of the valuers. Held: Decree of the court below dismissing the bill
affirmed. Pardee et al. v. County of Schuylkill, etc., 276 Pa. 246 (1923).
The county boards have no power in the revision of valuations except
such as is conferred by statute. In Pennsylvania by Sec. 13 of the Act of
July 27, ,812, P. L 441, 446, it is provided: "That the board of revision in
each county shall, on receiving the returns of assessors, proceed to examine
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and inquire whether the same have been made in conformity with the laws of
this Commonwealth. . . . And on the day appointed for determining
whether any property has been reduced too low . . . they shall proceed
to raise the price or valuation of any (such) property . . . and may
adjourn from day to day, until the whole of such valuation shall have been
revised, raised and equalized." Cf. N. J. Laws of Ygo6, P. L 211; N. Y.
Laws of 1911, Chap. 8o1.

Under similar statutes, the courts elsewhere have uniformly asserted the
right of the county boards to increase the assessed valuation of property,
if it is incumbent upon them to do so for purposes of equalization. Russell
v. Carlisle, 64 Ohio 16, 6o N. E. 198 (1888); New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Sussex Co. Board of Equalization, 7o N. J. L. x96, 56 AtI. 138 (i9o3). So long
as the boards act within their powers and employ legal means, equity will not
interfere and if owners consider that their property has been valued too
high, their only remedy is to follow the statutory method by appealing from
the assessment. Trust Co. v. Allwood, 71 N. J.L. 141, 71 AtL Iio (Ixo8);
Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. Township of Stowe, 252 Pa. i49, 97 AtL 197
(igx6).
The Pennsylvania statute-as is usually the case--does not indicate any
method by which the necessary information is to be obtained in order to
enable the board to raise and equalize the assessments. While the board
members are not required to have personal knowledge on the subject,
nevertheless if they have such, they may act on it. Star Mfilling Co. v. Board.
of Com'rs. of Nicholasville, 125 S. W. io~i (Ky. xgo). As there is no
statutory provision, it logically follows that they are vested with a reasonable discretion in adopting such necessary and appropriate methods as will
enable them to perform the duty imposed upon them, being responsible otily
for any abuse of the power. 'Based on similar reasoning, the court concluded in the principal case, that after the valuers made a report the board
could legally adopt the valuation as their own. Jermyn v. City of Scranton, 186 Pa. 595, 40 AtL 972 (1898).

TAXATioNt-TRANS-

TAx.-A New York Statute (9o9

N. Y. Consol.

Laws, c. 62, sec. 22o [4]) taxes transfers "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after" the death of the transferor. The grantor unconditionally transferred security to his son, who, one day later, according to
the grantor's expectation, transferred it to a trustee for the benefit of the
father for life with reservation of the power, with ; is consent, to revoke
the trust. Held: The transfer is not taxable. In re Miller's Estate, 198 N.
Y. S. 2o2 (App. Div. 1923).

A gift infer vivos is taxable as a transfer under the above statute if
the intention of the transferor is that it shall "take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after" the death of the transferor. The gift must be established by clear, satisfactory evidence. Tompkins v. Leary, x34 N. Y. App.
Div. 114 (i909). The evidence must show the donor's intent to give, a delivery of the t..;ng given, and an acceptance by the donee. Beaver v. Beaver
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et al., i7 N. Y. 42r, 22 N. E. 94a (i889); In Matter of Bolin, z36 N. Y.
r77, 32 N. E. 626 (1892). After the gift is made complete by delivery and
acceptance, the donee may redeliver it to .the donor as his agent. Gannon v.
McGuire, i6o N. Y. 476, 5s N. E. 7 (189W). If, after an absolute and unconditional transfer of title, the donee makes over the income to the transferor, this does not render the transfer one which is intended to take effect
at or after the testator's death, even if such conduct was contemplated or
expectant. In Matter of Hendricks, 163 App. Div. 413, 148 N. Y. S' 5it;
affirmed 214 N. Y. 663, io8 N. B. io95 (191S). But if the delivery and redelivery are so connected as to be part of one transaction, they must be construed together. Consequently, if the donee takes an apparently absolute
gift upon the conditidn that he shall pay the income to the donor for life
or that he shal deed back a life estate by a separate contemporaneous instrument, the statute will not be avoided. Reish v. Pennsylvania, zo6 Pa. 521
(1884) ; In Matter of Brandreth, 169 N. Y. 437, 6z N. E. 563 (x9o2). When
the grantor gives the remainder interest to another but keeps the life interest himself, such a transfer is taxable on his death, In Matter of Murphy,
i~zCal. 740, i9o Pac. 46 (g2o) ; as is a transfer whereby he reserves a life
income for himself. In Matter of Cornell, 17o N. Y. 423, 63 N. E. 445
18o, 69 N. E. 9o5
(190); Pebple of Illinois v. Estate of Moir, 207 Ill.
(1904). The reservation in the grantor of an unexercised power to revoke
does not per se make the transfer taxable. In Matter of Masury, 159 N. Y.
532, 53 N. E. x2/ (1899); In Matter of Bostwick, i6o N. Y. 489, 55 N. E.
208 (1899); Illinois v. Northern Trust Co., Ex'r, 289 IlL. 475 (i919).
Although the gift in the principal case has the appearance of an attempt
to evade the tax law, the case would seem to be correctly decided, since the
court agreed that it was unconditional, without qualification, and complete.
Under the amendment to section 220 of the Transfer Tax Law (Laws of
i922, c. 430) it seems probable that a contrary conclusion would now be
reached. As to the retroactive effect of state laws taxing succession, see 36
HAxv. L REv. 602 (923).
TRIALs-TIE JURY AS JUDGES OF LAW AND FAcs.-In a trial for murder, the court charged the jury: "You will note that we said you are the
judges of the law and of the fact, and while it is the business of the court
to instruct you as to the law, you have the power to disregard our instructions as to what the law is. You are the judges of the facts in the case,
and it is your duty to apply the law as the court instructs you; but, as we
said, you have the power to disregard our instructions, but not the right
under your oaths." The defendant, upon appeal, assigned as error the above
charge. Held: Affirmed. Commonwealth v. Castellana, Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, No. 31, October Term, 1922 (decided April 9, 1923).
The great 'weight of authority undoubtedly is that the jury are not the
judges of the law, and that the jury's function is merely to find the facts
and to apply to them the law laid down by the court. U. S. v. Battiste, 2
Sumn. 243 (U. S. C. C. 1837); Coinm. v. Porter, 5z Mass (io Mete.) 263
(1845) ; State v. Hodge, 5o N. H.-51o (i869); Thayer, Preliminary Treatise
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on Evidence, 256; Thompson, Trials (2d ed., 1912), sec. 2132 et seq.; Co.
Lit. (ist Am. Ed., 1853), 155 b, note 5.
A small minority holds that the jury have a right to act as judges of
both law and facts, and to disregard the court's instructions when they believe the law to be otherwise. State v. Buckley, 4o Conn. 246 (j873); Guy
v. State, _,6 Md. 692, 54 Atl. 879 (igo8) ; People v. Kuchta, 296 Ill. Io, 129
N. E. 528 (192o). For a review of the authorities in support of this view,
see note to Erving v. Crodock, Quincy's Rep. 553 (Mass. 1761); State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 15 (1849); and the opinion of Gray, J., in Sparf v. U. S., 156

U. S. 51 (1895).

A third group of states, bound by constitutional provisions, calls the jury
"judges of the law and the facts," but, in effect, follows the majority rule by
holding that the jury owes a duty always to follow the court's instructions as
to the law. Anderson v. State, 42 Ga. 9 (1871); Harris v. State, 7 Lea 538
(Tenn. 188I).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, under the provisions of Art. I, Section 7, of the Constitution of 1873, Laws of Pennsylvania, 1874, once followed the minority rule. Kane v. Comm., 89 Pa. 522 (1879). But since that
time, the court has somewhat hesitatingly advanced toward the view of the
third group, mentioned above. Nicholson v. Comm., 91 Pa. 390 (j879);
Comm. v. McManus, 143 Pa. 64, 21 Ati. roi8, 22 At. 761 (T891 ; Comm. v.
Bednorciki, 264 Pa. r24, io7 Atl. 666 (i9r9); Comm. v. Bryson, Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, No. 278, January Term, 1923 (not yet reported).
The decision of the court in the principal case now renders the law
'certain in this jurisdiction in accordance with that view; and, it is submitted, the court's thorough examination of the subject and its suggestions
as to the proper form of charge should prevent the recurrence here of this
much-mooted question.

VARIANCE-ALLGATIONS AS TO THE TIME OF OFFENSES.-In an action of
criminal conversation, the trial judge entered a nonsuit because the statement
of claim averred that the defendant had. sexual intercourse with the plaintiff's wife "on or about September ;'th, z92r," while the proof showed the
intercourse took place on August 26th, i921. Held: Reversed. Mazzarella
v. Whelan, 276 Pa. 313, i2o Atl. 141 (1923).
At common law in criminal cases it was always necessary that the time
of the offense be alleged in the indictment. State v. Pratt, 14 N. H. 456
(1843) ; State v. Tandy, 41 Tex. 291 (1874); State v. Fenlanson, 79 Me. 117,
8 Atl. 459 (1837). But that requirement has resolved itself into mere form,
since today it is generally held that where time does not constitute an element of the offense, proof of its commission at any time before the finding of the indictment and within the statute of limitations, is sufficient. State
v. Lyon, 45 N. J. L 272 (1883) ; Hume v. U. S., ri8 Fed. 689 (C. C. A. i9o2) ;
A number of
People v. Davis, 175 Mich. 594, 14! N. W. 667 (913).
states have, as a consequence, passed statutes, providing that where time is
not one of the elements of the crime, it may be alleged in the indictment as
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having been "on or about" a certain day. Hardebeck v. State, o Ind. 459
(1858) ; State v. Perry. 117 Ia. 463. 9r N. W. 765 (1902). Such an allegation would be insufficient at common law. State v. O'Keefe, 41 Vt. 691
(1869); Clark v. State, 34 Ind. 436 (i87o).
In civil actions, although the allegation of the time is seldom material,
it is usually stated that pleadings in personal actions must allege every
traversable fact to have taken place on some particular date. This is considered necessary for purposes of certainty even though a variance between
the time alleged and the proof is not fatal. Platt v. Jones, 59 Me. 232
(1871); Gordon v. Journal Publishing Co., 81 Vt. 257, 69 At. 6# (igo8).
Still the tendency of the modern cases is to hold that it is not necessary
that the exact date be given, but the date may be stated as being "on or
about" a certain day. Hamilton v. Peck, 84 Mich. 393, 47 N. NV. 681 (1891) ;
Southern Ry. Co. v. Taylor, r48 Ala. 52, 42 So. 625 (zo6). And the -question is to be determined at the trial whethei the proof is so variant from the
date alleged as to mislead the opposite party. Hamilton v. Peck, supra;
Georgia Ry. Co. v. Simons, 5o Ala. 400, 43 So. 731 (1907).
Likewise, if a certain date is alleged under a videlicet, it is not essential
to prove the particular date, where time is not a material element. of the
cause. of action. Rollins v. Atlantic City R. R. Co., 73 N. J. L. 64, 62
At. 929 (x9o6); St. Charles v. Stookey, I54 Fed. 772 (C. C. A. i9o7). But,
where time is material even the stating of it under a vzdelicet will not make
it immaterial. In the principal case, which is one of first impression in Pennsylvania, the court took the logical view in deciding that "on or about"
certain day was sufficiently certain as to the time, in view of the fact that
time was not a material element of the cause of action.
VENDOR

AND

PUnCHASER-R.EAL

PRoPE:R-Ty-ENcuMBRANcE.-The

pur-

chaser prayed specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate,
averring that he was prepared to pay the purchase price less the liens and
charges against it, consisting of a mortgage, judgment, and tax claims. The
contract contained no covenant against encumbrances, and the record did not
show that the purchaser had knowledge of any at the time of making the
contract, nor had he given any additional collateral obligation for the purchase money. The defendant demurred on the ground that since the contract of sale mentioned nothing about encumbrances the plaintiff should have
tendered the full purchase price. The demurrer was sustained by the lower
court. Held: Demurrer overrulc.!. Han.ta v. Carroll, Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, No. 85, January Term, 1923.
The principal case is of some importance because the court took the
occasion to restate the relevant principles of law. thereby reconciling previous
cases and settling in this jurisdiction that which had been uncertain. In so
doing the court considered the following circumstances as important: (i) the
fact as to whether the contract of sale contained a covenant against encumbrance; (2) knowledge of the encumbrance by the purchaser at the time of
making the contract; and (3) whether the purchaser gave any additional
collateral obligation to the vendor.
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It is well settled that where there is no covenant by the vendor, and the
encumbrances are unkiown to the purchaser, there is a presumption that the
latter may deduct the amount of such encumbrances from the unpaid purchase money. Christy v. Reynolds, j6 S. & R. 258 (Pa. 1827); see Maupin,
Marketable Title to Real Estate, (3d ed. 1921) se. 252. But where the
encumbrance is known to the purchaser at the time of the purchase, the
cases are divided into two groups. (i)Where the purchaser fails to take
a covenant from the vendor, but gives his bond or other collateral obligation
for the payment of the -purchase money, he is presumed to .have agreed to
assume all risks of title, and may not detain any of the purchase money.
Wilson's Appeal, iogPa. 6o6, 7 AtL 88 (1885); Coleman v. Whittle, 79 S. C.
212, 6o S. E. 523 (igo); Lazarus v. Lehigh W. B. Coal Co., 246 Pa. 178
92 Atl. 121 (1914); see Maupin, op. cit., sec. 253. (2) But there was considerable doubt before this decision what the result would be where the purchaser, having known of the encumbrance, failed to take a covenant against
encumbrances from the vendor, but also did not give any collateral obligation
for the full purchase price. The instant case decided that he is presumed
to have bought free of all encumbrances, and the burden is on the vendor to
produce evidence to the contrary.

WILLs-BEQUEsTs AND DEVISES-LAPSE OF ONE OF SEvERAL RFSIDUARY'
LcGAcms.-The testatrix left the residue of her estate to two designaled relatives, one of whom predeceased her. The husband of the testatrix, as next
of kin, claimed the lapsed portion. Held: The lapsed portion of the residue
goes to the surviving legatee. Mitchell's Estate, 79 Pa. Super. 2o8 (j922).
This is the first decision by a Pennsylvania appellate court under sec.
x5 (c) of the Wills Act of 1917, P. L 403, which was designed to change
the previous law of Pennsylvania on this question (Report of Commissioners, p. 69)., Several lower courts had, however, previously placed a
similar construction on this section. Jackson's Estate, 28 Pa. Dist. Rep.
943 (9xg); Connor's Estate, I Pa. Dist. & Co. Rep. 675 (x92i). Cf. Gregg's
Estate, 266 Pa. i8g, IO9 Ad. 777 (i92o) ". But it has been held to apply only

to cases where the residuary devisees are given aliquot shares and not
estates of different quality. McNulty's Estate, 29 Pa. Dist. Rep. 709
(1920).
A lapsed bequest of personalty at common law fell into the residue;
whereas a lapsed devise of realty descended to the heirs-at-law of the testator. Wright v. Hale, Fortes. i82 (Eng. x748); Greene v. Dennis, 6 Conn.
292 (1826); Massey's Appeal, 88 Pa. 470 (1879). But the modern rule is
that lapsed bequests and devises ordinarily both inure to the benefit- of the
residuary legatee unless a contrary intention is manifested. Thayer v. Wellington, 91 Mass. 283 (1864); Patterson v. Reed, 26D Pa. 319, io3 AtL 735
(1918). See Alexander, Wills (igi8), sees. i"77-8i.
There is an exception, however, when one of several residuary legacies
or bequests itself lapses or is revoked. According to the established English
Common law which is generally followed in this country, that share does
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not go to the surviving residuary legatees, but to the next of kin or heirsat-law as though there were an intestacy as to that portion. Lloyd v. Lloyd,
4 Beav. 231 (Eng. 1841); Dresel v. King, 198 Mass. 645, 85 N. E. 77
(i9o8). See Jarman, Wills (6th ed.) io56; Alexander, Wills, sec. 764. The
unsatisfactory reason often advanced for this rule is that what is already
part of the residue cannot fall back into the residue. Worcester Trust Co.
v. Turner, 210 Mass. 215, 96 N. k 132 (i911).
But the ground usually
stated is that where residuary legatees take individually and not as members
of a class they are tenants in common, and therefore the rule of survivorship
does not apply. Bagewell v. Dry, x P. Wins. 7oo (Eng. i72); Magnuson v. Magnuson, 197 IlL 496, 64 N. E."371 (902).
Conversely where the
residue is left to all the members of a class not individually designated,
they take as joint tetiants, and hence any lapsed portion goes to the survivors. In re Dunster (igog), i Ch. 1o3; In re Gamble,-13 Ont. L. Rep. 299
(I9o6); Crawford v. Carlisle, 2o6 Ala. 379, 89 So. 565 (IgzO.
The courts formerly followed the rule that a lapsed portion of the residue went according to the intestate laws even where the testator clearly
manifested an intention that the residue should not go to his next of kin or
heirs-at-law. Humble v. Shore, 7 Hare 247 (Eng. 1847); Gorgas' Estate,
x66 Pa. 269, 3 At. 86 (1895). Some American courts held themselves
bound to adhere strictly to the old common law rule, although freely criticizing it. Gray's Estate, x47 Pa. 67, 75, 23 AtL 2o5, 2o6 (I892); Wright v.
Wright, 225 N. Y. 329, x22 N. . 213 (i919). But a manifest intent will
usually take the case out of the rule in many states and in England. In re
Palmer (1893), 3 Ch. 369; Jackson v. Roberts, 14 Gray 546 (Mass. i86o).
These courts therefore generally strive to find a manifest intention even
where none is present in order to escape from this rule which tends to defeat the purpose to die testate as shown by the presence of a residuary
clause. Aitkin v. Sharp, 93 N. J. Eq. 336, 115 AtL 9t2 (zi9a). For the
same reason two jurisdictions have flatly rejected the rule, refusing to
follow iL Holbrook v. McCleary, - Ind. x61 (188I) ; Corbett v. Skaggs, iu
Kans. 38o, 2o7 Pac. 81g (ig92). In addition to Pennsylvania it has also been
abrogated by statute in Rhode Island, 19o9 R. L Gen. Laws, Ch., 254 se.. 7;
Woodward v. Cengdon, 34 R. I. 316, 83 AtL 433 (x912).

